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Positioning Uterus Transplantation as a ‘More Ethical’ 
Alternative to Surrogacy? 
 Exploring Symmetries between UTx and Surrogacy  




Within the ethics and science literature surrounding uterus transplantation (UTx) 
emphasis is often placed on the extent to which UTx might improve upon, or offer 
additional benefits when compared to, existing ‘treatment options’ for women with 
uterine factor infertility (AUFI) such as adoption and gestational surrogacy. Within 
this literature UTx is often positioned as superior to surrogacy because it can deliver 
things that surrogacy cannot (such as the experience of gestation). Yet, in addition 
to claims that UTx is superior in the aforementioned sense it is also often assumed 
(either implicitly or explicitly) that UTx is less fraught with ethical difficulties and 
thus should be considered a less morally problematic option. This article seeks to 
examine this assumption.   
 
Given that much UTx research has been performed in Sweden, a country where 
surrogacy is effectively although not currently explicitly forbidden, we do this 
through an analysis of the arguments underpinning a 2016 Swedish white paper 
which considered amending existing policy such that altruistic surrogacy 
arrangements would be permitted. By applying the white paper’s arguments for a 
restrictive position on altruistic surrogacy to the case of UTx using living altruistic 
donors we find that such arguments, if they hold in the case of surrogacy, apply 
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similarly to UTx. We thus suggest that, for reasons of consistency, a similar stance 
should be taken towards the moral and legal permissibility of these two practices. 
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At present – barring legal, regulatory, and financial obstacles to access – women 
with absolute uterine factor infertility (AUFI)1 have two options for parenthood: 
adoption and surrogacy. Recent trials in uterus transplantation (UTx) seek to add a 
third option. This would allow those desirous of the opportunity, and willing to 
undertake the risks of at least three major surgeries, to become, not only social and/or 
genetic parents as they may through adoption and traditional or gestational surrogacy 
arrangements2, but parents in a social, genetic, and gestational sense.3 Although still 
experimental, recent trials of the procedure using living donors in Sweden and the 
                                                 
1 ‘Absolute Uterine Factor Infertility’ is an umbrella term covering infertility problems in women 
who either lack a uterus as a result of congenital abnormality or previous hysterectomy or possess a 
uterus but due to physiological or anatomical abnormalities are unable to conceive or sustain 
gestation. See A. Lefkowitz, M. Edwards & J. Balayla. The Montreal Criteria for the Ethical 
Feasibility of Uterine Transplantation. Transpl Int 2012; 25:439. 
2 Here, traditional surrogacy refers to surrogacy arrangements in which the surrogate is genetically 
related to the child she gestates (ie, using her own ova and either donor sperm or the sperm of the 
intended father) and gestational surrogacy refers to arrangements in which the surrogate is not 
genetically related to the child she gestates (ie, where the ova of the intended mother or that of a 
donor is used). 
3 N.J. Williams. Should Deceased Donation be Morally Preferred in Uterine Transplantation Trials? 
Bioethics 2016; 30: 415.  
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USA have resulted in ten live births.4,5 Numerous other small-scale trials using living 
and deceased donors are also being performed and planned worldwide6 including, 
notably, a second ten case trial in Sweden.7    
 
As with all novel surgical procedures, discussions have emerged within both the 
ethics and science literature regarding the extent to which UTx improves upon or 
offers additional benefits when compared to existing ‘treatment’ options for women 
with AUFI such as adoption and surrogacy. In this paper, we focus on one specific 
aspect of such discussions. This concerns the way in which a number of authors – 
primarily associated with teams conducting scientific research into UTx – have 
positioned UTx as superior to surrogacy, not only because it can deliver what 
                                                 




livmodertransplantation.cid1516702 [Accessed October 10 2017]. 
5 Baylor, Scott &White. 2018. Second Mother who Received Transplanted Uterus Gives Birth. 
http://news.bswhealth.com/releases/second-mother-who-received-transplanted-uterus-gives-birth 
[accessed 18th April 2018] 
6 For details of additional trials planned worldwide see Williams, op. cit. note 3, p. 417 and H-K Tan 
et al. Starting a Uterus Transplantation Service: Notes from a Small Island. BJOG: Int J Obstet Gyn 
Online first. At the first congress of the International Society of Uterus Transplantation, Gothenburg 
September 18-19, it was reported that uterus transplantations also have been performed in Brazil, 
China, Czech Republic, Germany, India, Serbia and USA. 
7 Gustavsson Kubista, M. op. cit. note 4. 
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surrogacy cannot (such as the experience of gestation), but also because it is 
supposedly a less morally problematic alternative.8 
 
Although such authors rarely explicitly state that UTx is less fraught with ethical 
difficulties than surrogacy, this assumption seems implicit in their work. It is, for 
example, often claimed that UTx may prove a valuable treatment option for women 
who live in countries where surrogacy is forbidden by laws or effectively prohibited 
by restrictive regulations or who, as a result of their personal ethical or religious 
views, find themselves unable or unwilling to engage in surrogacy arrangements. 
Underpinning these claims thus seems to lie the assumption that the thorny ethical 
and complex regulatory issues raised by surrogacy which have been used, at least in 
part, to justify restrictive legislation in countries such as Sweden will not engage in 
the case of UTx or will engage only to a lesser degree. That is, women should be 
legally permitted to pursue, and are morally justified in pursuing, UTx in cases and 
contexts where surrogacy is unavailable to them.    
 
This assumption however warrants closer examination. For, it is not clear that the 
majority of the ethical arguments against surrogacy fail to engage in the case of UTx, 
                                                 
8 See, for example: M. Brännström et al. Uterus Transplantation: Animal Research and Human 
Possibilities. Fertil Steril 2012; 97: 1269; M. Brännström, M. et al. First Clinical Uterus 
Transplantation Trial: a Six-Month Report. Fertil Steril. 2014; 101: 1228; M. Grynberg et al.  Uterine 
Transplantation: a Promising Surrogate to Surrogacy? Ann NY Acad Sci 2011; 1221: 47 & 51; M. 
Olausson. Ethics of Uterus Transplantation with Live Donors. Fertil Steril 2014; 102: 40; J.A 
Robertson. Other Women’s Wombs: Uterus Transplants and Gestational Surrogacy. Journal of Law 
and the Biosciences 2016; 3: 71; H-K Tan et al. Starting a Uterus Transplantation Service: Notes from 
a Small Island. BJOG: Int J Obstet Gyn Online first: 3; G. Testa & L. Johannesson (2017). The 
ethical challenges of uterus transplantation. Curr Opi Organ Transplant. Online first: 4. 
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especially where live donors are used. Although we do not aim to make a judgement 
here on the relative strengths of the ethical arguments against surrogacy – or, indeed, 
the larger question of whether surrogacy and/or UTx are so problematic that they 
should be legally prohibited or morally condemned – we do wish to critically assess 
the view that UTx should be considered less morally fraught than surrogacy.9  
 
Given that much UTx research has been performed in Sweden – a country in which 
surrogacy is effectively although not currently explicitly forbidden through 
regulations which make both brokering and engaging in surrogacy arrangements 
impossible – we have chosen to do this through examination of the arguments 
underpinning a 2016 Swedish white paper. The white paper considers, among other 
things, whether current legislation and policy should be amended such that altruistic 
surrogacy arrangements would be permitted in Sweden.10; 11 
 
In what follows we examine in turn the major arguments provided in the white paper 
held to justify this restrictive stance, asking whether – and if so – when and how 
                                                 
9 For a comparison between living donor uterus transplantation and gestational surrogate motherhood 
with respect to the principle of equipoise, see G. Testa, E.C Koon & L. Johannesson. Living Donor 
Uterus Transplant and Surrogacy: Ethical Analysis According to the Principle of Equipoise. Am J 
Transplant 2017; 17: 912– 916. 
10 Utredningen om Utökade Möjligheter till Behandling av Ofrivillig Barnlöshet. Olika Vägar till 
Föräldraskap. Swedish Government Official Report (SOU) 2016:11. Stockholm: Ministry of Justice.  
11 It should be noted that subsequent to  this paper’s acceptance  in early 2018 the Swedish 
government decided to retain current policy regarding surrogacy which effectively prohibits its 
brokering and performance in Sweden. For more details see 
http://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2018/02/modernare-regler-om-assisterad-befruktning-
och-foraldraskap/ [Accessed April 23]. 
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these might engage in the case of UTx. Such arguments include, but are not limited 
to, claims that surrogacy may: threaten the autonomy of women; strengthen 
traditional and problematic views regarding gender roles; exploit women; risk 
serious harms to children; constitute an unacceptable form of burden-shifting; and 
be prohibitively difficult to regulate properly.  
 
We suggest, however, that in the vast majority of cases these arguments will, if they 
hold in the case of surrogacy, similarly apply to UTx especially in cases where living 
donors are used. As such, for reasons of consistency, we submit that legislators, 
policy makers and individuals ought to consider taking a similar stance in relation to 
the moral and legal permissibility of ‘altruistic’ forms of both surrogacy and UTx 
using living donors.  
 
II. BACKGROUND: SURROGACY IN SWEDEN AND THE 2016 
WHITE PAPER  
 
Unlike the majority of EU states, where surrogacy is subject to specific legislation, 
neither paid nor altruistic surrogacy are clearly regulated in Swedish law. There exist 
no general or specific provisions either forbidding or permitting surrogacy. 
However, while not explicitly prohibiting surrogacy arrangements, certain 
requirements in the regulation of assisted reproduction more generally make 
surrogacy impossible to access within the Swedish health care system. Specifically, 
legislation and policy requires that persons undergoing fertility treatment are 
married, cohabitating, or in a registered partnership, and that the couple includes a 
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woman who can carry and give birth to the intended child.12 Since 2016 single 
women have also been permitted to access IVF and donor insemination treatment 
provided that the egg is her own and she is able to gestate and give birth to the child.13 
As a result of this regulation, same-sex male couples, lesbian couples in which 
neither can carry a child, and opposite-sex couples in which the woman cannot carry 
a child are unable to access treatment. 
 
Sweden, like many other EU countries such as the UK and Germany, has enshrined 
into legislation the Roman legal principle Mater semper certa est.  This states that, 
irrespective of whether or not she has a genetic link to the child, the woman who 
gives birth to a child is that child’s legal mother.14 If the mother of the child is, at the 
time of delivery, legally married or recently widowed her spouse is presumed by law 
to be the father of the child.15 Thus, the process of attaining legal parenthood for 
intended parents in cases of gestational surrogacy arrangements using both of the 
intended parents own gametes would, were it permitted, be identical to that of 
‘närstående (related) adoption’ in Sweden. After the birth, a surrogate and her partner 
are considered the legal parents of the child. Therefore, in order for both intended 
parents to attain legal parenthood the intended father’s genetic parenthood must be 
                                                 
12 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. Lag (2006: 351) om Genetisk Integritet m.m. Swedish Code 
of Statutes 2006: 351. Chapter 7: 1§, 3§   
13 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. Lag (2016:18) om Ändring i Lagen (2006:351) om Genetisk 
Integritet m.m. Swedish Code of Statutes 2016:18. 
14 Ministry of Justice. Föräldrabalk (1949:381). Swedish Code of Statutes 1949:381. Ch. 1: 7§  
15 Ibid: Ch. 1:1§.   
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confirmed, and the surrogate must relinquish her parental rights and responsibilities 
before the intended mother is permitted to adopt the child.16 
 
As a result of this restrictive legislative stance, there has been much discussion in 
Sweden in recent years regarding whether or not it would be desirable (and possible) 
to amend existing legislation and policy surrounding reproduction in order to permit 
altruistic surrogacy arrangements between those with close emotional ties (such as 
friends and family members). In 2013, for example, the Swedish National Council 
on Medical Ethics (SMER) published a report which held that, under certain strict 
conditions and robust regulations (designed to minimise the harms and risks often 
associated with surrogacy arrangements for all parties) altruistic surrogacy ’could 
be an ethically acceptable method of assisted reproduction in Sweden’17. These 
conditions included the requirements that surrogates and intended parents enjoy a 
close relationship; that the surrogate has existing children and would not be 
genetically related to the child; that both parties are screened for suitability, provide 
valid consent, and have access to support and counselling throughout the process; 
and that the prospective child is told of her origins and provided with the means, 
once she reaches majority, to access information regarding the surrogate.18  
 
Yet, despite the conclusions and recommendations of SMER’s report, a white paper 
commissioned by the Swedish government with the remit of considering ‘different 
                                                 
16 Ministry of Justice. Föräldrabalk (1949:381). Swedish Code of Statutes 1949:381. Ch. 4: 3§; 
Utredningen om Utökade Möjligheter till Behandling av Ofrivillig Barnlöshet t, op. cit. note 10, p. 34 
17 Swedish National Council on Reproductive Ethics (2013). Assisted Reproduction – Ethical Aspects. 
Summary of a Report. SMER 2013:1. Stockholm: SMER: 7.  
18 Ibid: 6-9.  
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ways to increase the possibilities for involuntarily childless people to become 
parents’19 and specifically ‘whether to permit surrogacy in Sweden on the basis that 
it shall, in that case, be altruistic’20 came to the opposite conclusion. For, although 
the white paper, headed by Eva Wendel Rosberg and published in February 2016, 
held that permitting surrogacy could provide a number of benefits both within 
Sweden and internationally21 it concluded that ‘the advantages of permitting 
[altruistic] surrogacy [could not] be held to outweigh the disadvantages’. The 
disadvantages cited, unsurprisingly, map closely onto those which have, for the past 
thirty years, been extensively discussed in the ethics literature on surrogacy.22, 23 
These included claims that surrogacy:  
                                                 
19 Utredningen om Utökade Möjligheter till Behandling av Ofrivillig Barnlöshet, op. cit. note 10, p. 
47.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Such benefits included but were not limited to: allowing more involuntarily childless couples to 
become parents; reducing the numbers of Swedish citizens travelling abroad in order to engage in 
trans-national surrogacy arrangements and thus the legal and moral pitfalls associated with them such 
as exploitative arrangements, ‘limping’ legal parentage and stateless children; ensuring access to 
information regarding donor identity on the part of the child once it reaches legal majority and 
increasing the freedom of women who wish to act as surrogates for loved ones. For more information 
see ibid: 386.  
22 All translations of the white paper as well as other documents in Swedish were made by Guntram 
whose first language is Swedish. 
23 The ethics literature surrounding both commercial and altruistic surrogacy is vast but for an insight 
into some of the key areas of debate surrounding these practices see: E.S Anderson. Is Women’s 
Labor a Commodity? Philos Public Aff 1990; 19: 71–92; S.R Anleu. Surrogacy: For Love but Not for 
Money? Gend Soc 1992; 6: 30–48; R.J Arneson. Commodification and Commerical Surrogacy. 
Philos Public Aff 1992; 2:132–164; J. Glover 1989. Ethics of New Reproductive Technologies: The 
Glover Report to the European Commission. Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press; J. Oakley. 
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1. threatens the autonomy of women who may experience internal and/or 
external pressures to enter into surrogacy arrangements and continue with 
an arrangement once pregnant; 
2. strengthens traditional and problematic gender roles and exploits women; 
3.  risks serious harms to both the children of surrogates and those born through 
surrogacy arrangements; 
4.  unacceptably shifts the harms and burdens of reproduction to third parties 
5.  would be prohibitively difficult to regulate appropriately and determine 
responsibility for costs;24  
 
The sections that follow critically examine this white paper with the aim of 
demonstrating that many of the arguments against the introduction of surrogacy in 
Sweden should also, if accepted, challenge the appropriateness of UTx. By 
highlighting the similarities between these two practices we cast doubt upon the 
                                                 
Altruistic Surrogacy and Informed Consent. Bioethics 1992; 6: 269–287; L.M Purdy. Surrogate 
Mothering: Exploitation or Empowerment? Bioethics 1989; 3: 18–34; MJ. Radin 1996. Contested 
Commodities. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; J.A Robertson 1996. Children of 
Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 
S.J. Toledano. 2016. Sharing the Embodied Experience of Pregnancy: the Case of Surrogate 
Motherhood. In Bodily Exchanges, Bioethics and Border Crossing: Perspectives on Giving, Selling 
and Sharing Bodies E. Malmqvist & K. Zeiler ed. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge: 102–118; S. 
Wilkinson. The Exploitation Argument Against Commercial Surrogacy. Bioethics 2003; 17: 169–
187; S. Wilkinson 2003. Bodies for Sale: Ethics and Exploitation in the Human Body Trade. London: 
Routledge 
24 Utredningen om Utökade Möjligheter till Behandling av Ofrivillig Barnlöshet, op. cit. note 10, pp. 
391-445. 
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assumption that UTx should be considered a ‘more ethical’ alternative to surrogacy 
arrangements.  
 
III. AUTONOMY, INFORMED CONSENT, AND UNDUE PRESSURE 
 
The principle of respect for autonomy arises at several points in the white paper. In 
discussions of informed consent and risks of pressure it underscores the importance, 
in liberal societies such as Sweden, of a woman’s right to control her own body and 
reproductive capacities. Thus, it is noted that women and men should be free ‘to 
engage in altruistic actions involving the body and its functions, such as donating 
organs, blood, eggs, and sperm’ despite the fact that such actions may entail ‘pain, 
inconvenience, and medical risks’.25 Against this backdrop and given that the white 
paper finds that the physical and medical inconveniences for surrogate mothers of 
surrogacy arrangements are not unacceptably high, it holds that ‘psychologically 
healthy adult women’ ought to be permitted to enter into surrogacy arrangements in 
cases where it is ‘possible to ensure that the act is voluntary, informed consent can 
be provided, and there are no other strong reasons against it’.26  
 
However, despite these assertions, the white paper asks two questions. The first 
concerns whether it is, in fact, possible for a surrogate to understand the implications 
of and thus validly consent to ‘giving away a child that one has carried and given 
birth to, and if so when and how such a consent can be given’.27 The second regards 
                                                 
25 Utredningen om Utökade Möjligheter till Behandling av Ofrivillig Barnlöshet, op. cit. note 10, p. 
416.  
26 Ibid: 417.  
27 Ibid: 392.  
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when and how to assess whether ‘consent really is voluntary and not, for example, 
the result of pressure, coercion, or financial incentives’.28  
 
Putting questions of the possibility of consent aside, the white paper asserts that 
despite existing research providing only a few instances of women having 
encountered implicit or explicit external pressures to take part in surrogacy 
arrangements ‘the risk that a woman may encounter such pressures or experience 
emotional coercion to act as a surrogate mother cannot be ignored’.29 It notes that 
the risks of external pressures undercutting consent are most likely in cases of 
altruistic surrogacy where the ‘woman is close to the involuntarily childless 
individual [or couple]’30 as the surrogate will have witnessed the strength of the 
individual(s) desire to become (a) parent/s and family and friends often ‘have a 
strong emotional influence over each other’.31 It also claims, however, that where 
surrogacy arrangements occur between those without a close emotional relationship 
there is a greater risk of hidden financial motives. Few specific explanations as to 
why this would be the case, or how such pressure would be enacted, are provided, 
as this claim primarily draws on a brief overview of an increase in purportedly 
altruistic surrogacy arrangements but which are suspected to be commercial in nature 
found in the Greece.32 This is also one of the few instances where parallels are made 
to Swedish regulations surrounding live organ donation. Here it notes that the risk 
                                                 
28 Ibid: 419.  
29 Ibid: 422. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Z. Papaligoura, D. Papadatou & T. Bellali. Surrogacy: The Experience of Greek Commissioning 
Women. Women Birth 2015; 28:4: e110–e118.  
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of commercialization in live organ donation between individuals without a close 
relationship ‘has been one of the reasons for the requirement that there should be a 
close relation between the donor and recipient in live organ donation’33, 34 and 
recognises the parallel risks in surrogacy arrangements between those without a 
close emotional relationship. 
 
Given the risks of both external and internal pressures, the white paper concludes 
that it would not be possible, in Sweden (or indeed, perhaps anywhere), to create a 
system which both allows women the freedom to act as surrogates in cases where 
they can provide consent and protects those whose capacity to consent to entering 
into surrogacy arrangements has been compromised either internally (by, for 
example, the prospect of monetary reward) or externally (through coercion or 
manipulation by friends and family members). The white paper therefore 
recommends a precautionary approach to risk management in this case, holding that 
as a result of epistemic limitations it is: 
 
…not possible to - with reasonable measures - create satisfactory guarantees 
that women are not acting as surrogate mothers because of pressure, because 
                                                 
33 Utredningen om Utökade Möjligheter till Behandling av Ofrivillig Barnlöshet , op. cit. note 10, p. 
423. 
34  It should be noted that the Swedish Transplantation Act specifies that ‘if there are certain reasons 
such an intervention can be made on another person than those previously stated’ which in practice 
opens up for non-related live organ donations. See Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. Lag Om 
Transplantation m.m. Swedish Code of Statutes 2006: 351, 7§. See also, Utredningen om donations- 
och transplantationsfrågor. Organdonation. En Livsviktig Verksamhet. Swedish Government Official 
Report (SOU) 2015:84. Stockholm: Ministry of Justice: 464. 
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they feel that they have to or because of economic gain. Neither is it possible 
to create satisfactory guarantees against pressure during the process of the 
arrangement. This is a strong argument against allowing surrogate 
motherhood35 
 
In what follows, we explore how such arguments might be applied to the case of 
UTx. Given the precautionary approach to the management of the risk that surrogates 
may have their capacity to consent compromised advocated by the white paper, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that UTx would likely not be permitted should it be assessed 
in a similar manner. Living donor UTx, after all, poses very similar risks to 
surrogacy. For, unless only altruistic donation by strangers and those already 
undergoing a hysterectomy is permitted: 
 
…donors may be coerced or manipulated into donation by those holding 
stakes in their donation and […] may also feel an internal pressure to donate 
even in the absence of actively coercive or manipulative acts.36  
 
Indeed, just as the white paper asks whether a surrogate can truly understand the 
implications of giving away the child she has gestated for nine months37 so too has 
it been questioned whether a uterus donor can fully understand the ramifications of 
donating a uterus. For, although total abdominal hysterectomy is considered a 
                                                 
35 Utredningen om Utökade Möjligheter till Behandling av Ofrivillig Barnlöshet, op. cit. note 10, pp. 
425-426.  
36 Williams, op. cit. note 3, p. 422. 
37 Utredningen om Utökade Möjligheter till Behandling av Ofrivillig Barnlöshet, op. cit. note 10, p. 
392. 
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routine operation in many nations, uterus donation poses a number of psychological 
risks similar to that of hysterectomy which include, but are not limited to, feelings 
of a loss of gender identity and sexual dysfunction.38 Indeed, Catsanos et al note:  
 
A uterus is only expendable if the potential donor is unequivocally certain 
that she will not now nor in the future desire another pregnancy herself . . . 
some of the women who responded to news of UTx had chosen 
hysterectomy as the solution to a medical problem, thinking they had 
completed their families, only to find themselves in a new relationship and 
desirous of having children with their new partner.39 
 
Furthermore, and unlike a routine hysterectomy, but in line with other assisted 
reproductive technologies, the transfer of a uterus and the subsequent gestation and 
birth of a child could result in unanticipated relational complexities between the 
donor, the recipient, and the child created. Such complexities could require 
renegotiations of the meanings accorded to kinship and embodiment especially in 
contexts where gestational motherhood is accorded greater significance than genetic 
motherhood.40  Indeed, while the Swedish UTx team’s reports of possible effects on 
                                                 
38 I. Kisu, I. et al. (2013). Current Status of Uterus Transplantation in Primates and Issues for Clinical 
Application. Fertil Steril 2013; 100: 288.  
39 R. Catsanos., W. Rogers & M. Lotz. The Ethics of Uterus Transplantation. Bioethics 2013; 27: 71.    
40 Other assisted reproductive technologies have, after-all, been shown to call for new ways to talk 
about and construe familial bonds and embodiment among the individuals involved in and who result 
from them. Such work may require emotional as well as relational work as it involves challenging 
beliefs and assumptions which have previously been taken for granted. See for example G. Becker 
2000. The Elusive Embryo: How Women and Men Approach New Reproductive Technologies. 
Berkeley; University of California Press; J. Edwards et al, ed. 1993. Technologies of Procreation: 
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the relationship between donor and recipient41 might not present strong arguments 
to support claims of UTx having significant and negative consequences for the 
relationships between participants, their findings do indicate that UTx, in line with 
other live organ donations, could result in familial and relational conundrums. In 
light of previous research on such complexities in live kidney and live liver 
donation,42 it could therefore be argued that UTx might result in painful experiences 
of guilt and responsibility, especially in cases where the donation or transplantation 
proves unsuccessful or causes significant medical complications.43   
                                                 
Kinship in the Age of Assisted Conception. Manchester: Manchester University Press; S.B. Franklin 
& S. McKinnon, ed. 2001. Relative Values: Reconfiguring Kinship Studies. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press; T. Freeman 2014. Relatedness in Assisted Reproduction. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; L. Guntram Hooked on a feeling? Exploring Desires and ‘Solutions’ in Infertility 
Accounts Given by Women with ‘Atypical’ Sex Development. Health: 2016; Online first; H. van 
Parys et al. Constructing and Enacting Kinship in Sister-to-Sister Egg Donation families: a Multi-
Family Member Interview Study. Sociol Health Illn 2016 Online first; M.J Pashigian. The Womb, 
Infertility, and the Vicissitudes of Kin-Relatedness in Vietnam. J Vietnam Stud 2009; 4: 34 – 65; S.J 
Toledano & K. Zeiler 2017. Hosting the Others’ Child? Relational Work and Embodied 
Responsibility in Altruistic Surrogate Motherhood. Fem Theor 2017: Online first; C. Thompson. 
2005. Making Parents: The Ontological Choreography of Reproductive Technologies. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
41 S. Järvholm, L. Johannesson & M. Brännström. Psychological Aspects in Pre-Transplantation 
Assessments of Patients Prior to Entering the First Uterus Transplantation Trial. Acta Obstet Gynecol 
Scand 2015; 94: 1037. 
42 See, for example, N. Scheper-Hughes. The Tyranny of the Gift: Sacrificial Violence in Living 
Donor Transplants. Am J of Transpl 2007;7: 507–511; K. Zeiler, L. Guntram & A. Lennerling. Moral 
Tales of Parental Living Kidney Donation: a Parenthood Moral Imperative and Its Relevance for 
Decision Making. Med Health Care Philos 2010; 13: 225–236.  
43 See, for example, P. Gill & L. Lowes. The Kidney Transplant Failure Experience: A Longitudinal 
Case Study. Prog Transplant 2009; 19: 114–121; Ibid. Renal transplant failure and disenfranchised 
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Importantly, in addition to the similar kinds of risks and relational complexities 
posed by living uterus donation and surrogacy, the current state of knowledge 
regarding the rationales and motivations of uterus donors and the extent to which 
they have so far experienced pressure or regret is far more limited than in the case 
of surrogacy. For despite assertions on the part of the Swedish team that living 
donors have experienced few psychological sequelae as a result of their donation 
through both personal communication44 and media reports45 there have, as yet, been 
no published reports of experiences of living uterus donors. Thus, given that the 
white paper finds the evidence available in the context of surrogacy to be insufficient 
there is little doubt that the same conclusion should be reached in the case of UTx. 
                                                 
grief: Participants’ Experiences in the First Year Post-Graft Failure – a Qualitative Longitudinal 
Study. Int JNurs Stud 2014; 51: 1271–1280; J. Spiers, J.A Smith & M. Drage. A Longitudinal 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of the Process of Kidney Recipients’ Resolution of 
Complex Ambiguities within Relationships with Their Living Donors. J Health Psychol 2016; 21: 
2600–2611; C. Papachristou. Living Donor Liver Transplantation and its Effect on the Donor-
Recipient Relationship – a Qualitative Interview Study with Donors. Clin Transplant 2009; 23: 382–
391. 
44 This was underscored both in our conversations with physicians involved in the Swedish trial 
during the 2016 symposium held at Lancaster University on the Ethics of Uterus Transplantation and 
the congress of ISUTx in September 2017 as well as in  Guntram’s conversations with the 
Sahlgrenska team as part of her ongoing research.  
45 It should, however, be noted that media reports cover recipients who have given birth and not the 
two who had the transplant removed prior to embryo transfer. See, for example, H. Björnheden, L. 
Wiman & O. Ohlsson O. 2016. Ingreppet Gav Tove Barn. Göteborgs-Posten 15 November: 6-7; F. 
Wikander. 2016. Tack för att Jag Fick din Livmoder!. Amelia 16 June: 29-32; H. Westman. 2015. 




IV. THE EXPLOITATION AND COMMODIFICATION OF WOMEN 
 
Another key set of concerns running through the white paper regard whether, even 
where a woman consents to acting as a surrogate, the practice should nevertheless 
be forbidden in order to avoid both the wrongful exploitation of women and the 
perpetuation of problematically discriminatory and essentialist views about the 
‘proper’ role of women and their bodies. 
 
With respect to the former, for example, although no effort is made within the 
document to define ‘exploitation’ or what makes a practice itself/an instance of a 
practice exploitative in a normative sense46, concerns are raised regarding whether 
permitting either or both altruistic and paid surrogacy in Sweden could lead to the 
exploitation of women both nationally and internationally. Within Sweden, for 
example, the white paper suggests that forbidding paid surrogacy in Sweden would 
protect against the exploitation of women with low socio-economic status who may 
be unfairly induced into surrogacy by their circumstances. However, despite this, it 
is also noted that permitting only altruistic surrogacy might be considered 
exploitative for the opposite reason: that, given the amount of time and effort it takes 
to gestate a child, surrogates might reasonably expect to be paid for their labour.  47  
 
                                                 
46 For an excellent discussion of surrogacy and the concept of exploitation see A. Wertheimer. Two 
Questions about Surrogacy and Exploitation. Philos Public Aff 1992; 21: 211-239.  
47 Utredningen om Utökade Möjligheter till Behandling av Ofrivillig Barnlöshet, op. cit. note 10, p. 
395. 
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Similarly, outside Sweden the white paper expresses the concern that permitting 
altruistic surrogacy within Sweden has the potential to ‘normalise’ surrogacy and 
lead to a situation in which: 
 
…persons who do not meet the criteria for treatment in Sweden, who do not 
have access to a surrogate mother, or who do not want to be on the waiting 
lists that are expected to occur in the health care system, instead choose to 
hire a commercial surrogate abroad.48 
 
This kind of ‘reproductive tourism’ may well not be considered necessarily 
exploitative should individuals travel to countries where adequate regulations and 
safeguards prevent the exploitation of surrogates. However, the concern here is that 
Swedish couples will travel to countries where surrogacy is comparatively cheap or 
regulated less stringently, which is more likely to lead to the exploitation of poor 
women. Thus, as demonstrated, concerns expressed within the white paper closely 
map on to those which have been discussed extensively in the ethics literature 
surrounding exploitation and surrogacy in both developed and developing nations49.  
 
                                                 
48 Ibid: 393. 
49 Notable examples of this literature include: R. Ber. Ethical Issues in Gestational Surrogacy. Theor 
Med and Bioeth 2000; 21: 153-69; E.S Anderson. Is Women’s Labour a Commodity? Philoso Public 
Aff 1990; 19: 71-92; Wertheimer, op. cit. note 46, pp. 211-239; S. Wilkinson. 2003, op. cit. note 23, 
Ch. 8; S. Wilkinson 2003. op. cit. note 23, pp. 125-145; M. Field. 1989. Surrogate Motherhood: The 
Legal and Human Issues (expanded edition). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: Ch. 2; F. 
Baylis. 2014. Transnational Commercial Contract Pregnancy in India. F. Baylis & C. Macleod, ed. 
Family Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 265-286.  
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In terms of discrimination the white paper suggests that, even in the absence of 
concerns regarding the exploitation of surrogates, there may still be good reasons to 
refrain from permitting surrogacy as part of the wider project of securing equality 
for women by rejecting traditionalist, essentialist and patriarchal views regarding 
gender and the role of women as ‘givers/providers’50 who are essentially or, most 
importantly, gestators and mothers. That permitting surrogacy risks perpetuating 
such views, however, is not held to constitute sufficient reason to forbid surrogacy 
in Sweden as it is noted that just as some authors view surrogacy to be necessarily 
damaging to women, others suggest it has the potential to prove emancipatory, 
strengthening the woman’s autonomy to control her own body and its processes.51 
 
A linked concern, raised in the white paper with respect to the Swedish context, 
regards the moral acceptability of ‘burden-shifting’ in reproduction and whether 
surrogacy is appropriate as the risks and costs associated with reproduction are 
shifted from the intended parents onto a third party. When read at face value this is 
an odd argument, given that the majority of paid labour constitutes burden-shifting. 
However, while shifting the burdens of reproduction onto third parties is not 
necessarily morally problematic for those who lack the ability to gestate and birth 
their future children, permitting surrogacy in such cases could lead to an increased 
acceptance of ‘convenience’ surrogacy in Sweden which, although posing few 
                                                 
50 Utredningen om Utökade Möjligheter till Behandling av Ofrivillig Barnlöshet , op. cit. note 10. cit. 
note 9. p. 395. 
51 Ibid: 435.  
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problems for the wealthy, could lead to the further marginalisation of less 
advantaged women.52  
 
As in the previous section of this article, however, it seems that very similar concerns 
regarding exploitation and the perpetuation of discriminatory and problematic views 
regarding women and their bodies can be, and indeed, have been, raised in the 
context of UTx. 
 
Just as concerns are expressed that permitting ‘altruistic’ surrogacy in Sweden may 
encourage women unable to find a surrogate in Sweden to go abroad and engage in 
paid surrogacy, so too have concerns been raised regarding the potential for the 
creation of a ‘black market’ in uteri similar to that seen in kidneys.53  For, it is 
possible that women who fail to meet the selection criteria for UTx in their ‘home’ 
countries, lack the necessary financial resources to pay for their own and their 
donor’s medical expenses in their home country, and/or are unable to find friends 
and family members willing to donate may look further afield, seeking to purchase 
uteri from women who find themselves in such precarious economic positions that 
they are willing to sell their uteri. In a paper regarding UTx in the middle east Altawil 
                                                 
52 The view that shifting the burdens of reproduction may be considered more objectionable in cases of 
convenience (i.e. where it is not motivated by medical reasons such as an inability to conceive or sustain 
gestation) has also been expressed in Government reports of other nations regarding surrogacy such as 
that of the UK’s Warnock report. See:  M. Warnock et al. 1984. Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into Human Fertilisation and Embryology. London: Her Majestys Stationery Office. S.8.17. 
    
53 For a general account of such worries in the context of UTx see: B.M. Dickens. Legal and ethical 
issues of uterus transplantation. Int J of Gynecol Obstet 2016; 133: 126-7.  
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and Arawi express this concern, noting that just as some Syrian refugee families 
have:  
 
resorted to selling organs to make ends meet… it is very conceivable that 
impoverished families, especially refugees that have found themselves in a 
dire financial situation, may resort to selling their or their daughters’ uteri in 
order to be able to survive.54  
 
They thus ask whether it would be morally justifiable to introduce uterine UTx given 
that it ‘has the potential to become another vehicle for human expoitation’.55  
  
More generally, discussions have also emerged within the ethics literature regarding 
whether both permitting (and/or providing public support for) UTx may reinforce 
the damaging sexist and pronatalist beliefs regarding the importance of gestation and 
genetic relatedness for both womanhood and parenthood. Thus, the concern here is 
that a government’s acceptance (and provision) of UTx may collude with and 
perpetuate the erroneous and discriminatory beliefs which exacerbate the pain and 
suffering experienced by many infertile women. As a result they may also be more 
likely to discount other options for parenthood, such as adoption, in favour of 
undergoing risky and expensive procedures and interventions aimed at replicating 
more traditional methods of founding a family.56 This again could be especially 
                                                 
54 Z. Altawil & T. Arawi. Uterine Transplantation: Ethical Considerations within Middle Eastern 
Perspectives. Devel World Bioeth 2016; 16: 97.  
55 Ibid.  
56 For an insight into this debate see: S. Wilkinson & N.J Williams. Should Uterus Transplants be 
Publicly Funded? J of Med Ethics 2016: 42 (9), 559–565; M. Lotz. Commentary on Nicola Williams 
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worrying in countries where ‘social respect for women is still very much connected 
to their ability to give birth to a child’.57 
 
When it comes to concerns regarding burden-shifting we acknowledge that it would 
be nonsensical to argue that those desirous of uterus transplants seek to shift the 
burdens of gestation and birth onto others. That UTx avoids raising such concerns, 
has been noted by scholars such as Grynberg et al58 and Olausson et al59. Indeed, in 
a recent paper examining the possibility of a duty to choose UTx over surrogacy 
(once UTx becomes safe and effective) John Robertson rather startlingly notes:  
 
 The discomfort with surrogacy for convenience shares a kindred ethical root 
as the argument for uterus transplant instead of surrogacy. Market power 
allows a woman to hire the surrogate even when she could physically gestate 
herself. If we are troubled by convenience cases, then we should be troubled 
by women who reject safe and effective transplants and hire [other] women 
to gestate [their children]60   
 
 Yet whilst living donor UTx does allow the intended mother to shoulder the physical 
burdens and risks associated with gestation and childbirth - and thus reduces the risks 
                                                 
and Stephen Wilkinson ‘Should Uterus Transplants Be Publicly Funded?’ J of Med Ethics 2016: 42: 
570–571; S. Wilkinson & N.J Williams. Public Funding, Social Change and Uterus Transplants: a 
Response to Commentaries. J of Med Ethics 2016; 42: 572–573. 
57 Altawil & Arawi, op. cit. note 54, p. 97. 
58 Grynberg et al, op. cit. note 8, p. 47.  
59 Olausson et al, op. cit. note 8, p. 40.  
60 Robertson, op. cit. note 8, p. 77.  
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undertaken by third parties – living uterus donation is not risk free. Deceased uterus 
donation, if shown to be successful, would reduce such risks even further and thus 
might also be considered preferable if we are concerned to ensure that the burdens 
of reproduction are carried, insofar as is possible, by those who stand to reap its 
benefits. On a slightly different note UTx using living donors may well also shift 
feelings of responsibility for the burdens and harms resulting from uterine factor 
infertility onto the female family members and friends of those who seek UTx.61 
 
V. THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD 
 
In Sweden62 it is held that in matters affecting the interests of children, both future 
and existing, their welfare must be taken into account, and thus in the context of 
assisted reproduction, practices and policies which benefit prospective parents but 
pose significant risks of physical and/or psychological harm to children are 
prohibited. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that another concern discussed at length 
in the white paper is whether surrogacy is compatible with the welfare of both 
children born through surrogacy arrangements and surrogates’ existing children. 
 
The white paper suggests that although permitting surrogacy in Sweden has the 
potential to reduce some of the harms to children created which have arisen as a 
result of Swedish parents engaging in trans-national surrogacy arrangements – such 
                                                 
61 This concern is closely ties to those discussed in the previous section of this article regarding undue 
pressure and coercion.  
62  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 s. 13 (5). 
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as ‘limping legal parentage’63, statelessness, and an inability to access information 
regarding the identity of their surrogates and (where applicable) gamete donors64 – 
it also risks a number of serious harms to children which ‘speak strongly’ against 
permitting surrogacy in Sweden.65 In terms of surrogate-conceived children, the risks 
explored and highlighted include the possible harms and familial instability that the 
child created may face should the surrogacy arrangement go awry; and the possible 
negative impact that being born through surrogacy may have on identity formation, 
attachment during the early years, and family relationships during the later years of 
childhood.66 Concerns, however, are also raised regarding the welfare of surrogates’ 
existing children as it is suggested that such children may, depending on their ages, 
experience fears that they too will be ‘given away’ or feel jealousy and anger towards 
the prospective child during pregnancy, or worry for the child after his/her birth.67 
 
The white paper does acknowledge however that, just as in the case of discussions 
of informed consent and risks of pressure and coercion, there is little evidence 
available regarding the outcomes of children born through surrogacy or the children 
of surrogates. It recognises that the few studies undertaken regarding these outcomes 
suggest there is little reason to assume they will fare any worse in terms of familial 
                                                 
63 This term refers to situations in which after a surrogacy arrangement legal parentage is granted in 
one state but not in another, namely, the state in which the intended parents of the surrogacy 
conceived child are resident.   
64 Utredningen om Utökade Möjligheter till Behandling av Ofrivillig Barnlöshet, op. cit. note 10, p. 
390. 
65 Ibid: 415. 
66 Ibid: 410-414. 
67 Ibid: 414.  
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relationships and psychological welfare than other children.68 However, despite this, 
the white paper notes a number of problems regarding the data available – such as 
that the majority of the available studies on outcomes have been conducted by one 
UK Research Group (The Centre for Family Research at Cambridge University); no 
long term studies have occurred; and there is a notable lack of studies focusing on 
the outcomes for children in cases of conflict between the surrogate and intended 
parents.69 As such, the white paper again suggests a 'precautionary approach’ – 
placing the burden of proof on those who would claim that surrogacy is not harmful 
– and that uncertainties regarding the effects of surrogacy on child welfare, ‘strongly 
speak against permitting surrogacy’70 in Sweden. 
 
Were such an approach translated into the context of UTx, a similar conclusion 
would almost certainly be reached. This is so for two reasons. First, whilst surrogacy 
is an established practice, UTx is not and thus there is even less evidence available 
to deny or support the claim that it is compatible with the best interests of children. 
Thus, given the precautionary approach advocated by the authors in the case of 
surrogacy, a lack of evidence supporting the claim that UTx is not likely to cause 
significant harm to children should, for reasons of consistency, be held to ‘strongly 
speak against permitting’ UTx in Sweden too.  Second, is that although there is little 
empirical evidence at this time, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that being 
gestated in a donated uterus is likely to prove more risky than (or, at the very least, 
as risky as) being born through surrogacy in terms of negative effects on child 
                                                 
68 Ibid: 412.   
69 Ibid: 415. 
70 Ibid: 415.  
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welfare.71 For, whilst the risks to the physical health of children born through 
surrogacy are similar to those of reproduction more generally, concerns have been 
forwarded suggesting that children born through UTx are more likely to experience 
physical harms during pregnancy which could have grave effects upon their future 
welfare. Daar and Klipstein summarise these risks as follows:  
 
the medical literature suggests that gestating a foetus in a transplanted uterus 
poses several risks to the developing child, including (i) the potential for 
compromised uterine blood flow and its effect on the developing fetus, (ii) 
concomitant maternal renal abnormalities associated with some of the 
conditions that result in an absent or malformed uterus which may increase 
the risk of preeclampsia and hypertension, and (iii) the potential fetal 
teratogenic effects of exposure to immunosuppressants72, 73  
 
Given this, if a concern to act in the best interests of children is sufficient to justify 
prohibiting surrogacy in Sweden, the same would seem to go for UTx: i.e. it too 
should be prohibited.74 
                                                 
71 J. Daar & S. Klipstein 2016. Refocusing the Ethical Choices in Womb Transplantation. Journal of 
Law and the Biosciences 2016: 3: 388. 
72 Ibid: 384. 
73 In order to retain balance it should be noted that a somewhat different (and less negative) take on 
the physical risks for children born through UTx is presented in the following paper: G. Testa, E. 
C Koon, L. Johannesson. op. cit. note 9, p. 912–916.  
74 It should be noted, however, that although concerns regarding child welfare can be forwarded 
against both UTx and surrogacy questions remain regarding whether the suggestion that one ought to 
prohibit either surrogacy or UTx because children born as a result of surrogacy arrangements or UTx 
may experience lower levels of welfare than those born in a more traditional manner, is 
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VI. REGULATORY DIFFICULTIES 
 
Another concern identified in the white paper regards the possibility of designing an 
appropriate regulatory framework for surrogacy in Sweden given tensions between 
the rights and interests of surrogates, intended parents and the children created 
through surrogacy; and difficulties in determining and enforcing responsibility for 
the costs surrogacy arrangements could impose on the Swedish health system, 
employers, and social services.  
 
Regarding the former, two possible tensions between the interests of such parties are 
discussed: 
 
1. the surrogate’s interest in controlling her own body and the interests of the 
intended parents and the potential child in ensuring a healthy birth 
2. the right of the surrogate to choose to take care of the child she has gestated 
and given birth to and the right of the intended parents to take care of the 
child who is genetically related to them and who exists only because of their 
actions 
 
It is noted, for example – through reference to one case in which a surrogate mother, 
and the intended father, opposed the intended mother’s application to adopt the 
                                                 
philosophically defensible. For, given that it can be relatively safely assumed that once born children 
created through both surrogacy and UTx are likely to have lives that are worth living it is more than a 
little perverse to suggest that their welfare ought to be protected by preventing their very existence. 
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child75 – that although ensuring that surrogacy arrangements are not enforceable 
either during pregnancy or for a number of weeks post-birth protects the interests 
and rights of the surrogate this results in uncertainty for intended parents and may 
cause them significant stress and worry. Similarly, and more dramatically, it is 
suggested that in rare circumstances some surrogates would abuse a right to 
withdraw their consent by demanding compensation or favours from the intended 
parents, and thus taking advantage of their precarious situation in order to follow 
through with the arrangement.76  
 
Duplicitous surrogates however, are not the only concern, as the white paper notes 
that intended parents may also, in rare circumstances, change their minds partway 
through the arrangement, and refuse to take the child once born, such as where it is 
discovered that the fetus has a congenital abnormality liable to result in disability77. 
This forces the surrogate into a difficult situation where she must decide whether to 
abort the pregnancy or to keep or put the child up for adoption once born. As a result 
of these concerns, the authors assert that it is difficult, if not impossible, to create a 
regulatory framework for surrogacy that balances the interests of the different parties 
should one of them change their mind. Indeed, irrespective of the chosen solution, 
the white paper concludes that situations may occur in which the child fares badly. 
                                                 
75 In this particular case the surrogate mother was the sister of the intended and genetic father and the 
intended mother was the genetic mother of the child. See Högsta Domstolen NJA (2006), p. 505. 
76 Utredningen om Utökade Möjligheter till Behandling av Ofrivillig Barnlöshet , op. cit. note 10, p. 
437. 
77 Ibid: 440. 
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Thus, the presence of such difficulties is held to constitute ‘a strong reason against 
allowing surrogate motherhood in Sweden’.78 
 
The white paper also discusses regulatory issues relating to financial questions such 
as: who should be held financially responsible for meeting the healthcare and other 
costs of surrogacy, especially in the case of complications and whether, when, and 
if so, how much, compensation should be provided to surrogates. In the Swedish 
health insurance system, the employer of the pregnant woman covers part of the cost 
if a pregnant woman needs to reduce her work hours or needs to be on sick leave as 
a result of the pregnancy. In light of this the white paper asks whether it, for example, 
is reasonable that these costs should be covered by the surrogate mother’s health 
insurance and by her employer. In addition, pregnancy generates other expenses 
connected to treatment, pregnancy and delivery. Again, the white paper asks, who is 
to cover such costs? In response to this, two main options are discussed: the state, 
and intended parents. While the white paper asserts that a model in which the state 
covers income losses not covered by the social security system or by the surrogate’s 
own insurance at least in principle would be the least dubious option, it is concluded 
that it would - in light of the public costs that will be generated – still be difficult to 
find a model that is both acceptable in principle and reasonable.79 
 
What happens when similar arguments are applied to UTx?  We recognize that the 
parallels with the case of UTx are not necessarily straightforward, at least not with 
                                                 
78 Ibid: 440. 
79 It should be noted however, that the white paper does not elaborate on reasons behind the 
anticipated difficulties. See Utredningen om Utökade Möjligheter till Behandling av Ofrivillig 
Barnlöshet , op. cit. note 10, p. 444. 
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respect to the first of the two regulatory questions. Far fewer concerns are anticipated 
regarding how to balance the interests and rights of the uterus donors and recipients. 
In terms of respect for autonomy, for example, there is little reason to assume that a 
uterus donor would not, like all other organ donors in Sweden, have the right to 
withdraw consent at any time prior to the retrieval and transplantation of the uterus80 
and that, once transplanted, the recipient would, given her right to control her own 
body, possess the right to request the removal of the uterus and/or to control her 
pregnancy should the transplant and subsequent embryo transfers prove successful. 
There could, of course, be scenarios in which a uterus donor attempts to exert control 
over or influence the decisions of the recipient; or expects access to, and a 
relationship with, the child once born as has been reported in surrogacy 
arrangements. However, it seems unlikely that a donor would, for example, seek the 
removal/return of the donated uterus.81 Indeed, since the mater est principle would 
apply in the case of UTx, it does not introduce the same legal uncertainties in terms 
of assigning parenthood. Thus, in this respect, UTx does seem to pose fewer 
regulatory complexities than surrogacy. 
 
With regard to the second regulatory difficulty, however, it does seem that UTx 
raises similar issues in certain respects. In terms of direct financial compensation for 
donors UTx does seem to raise less complicated questions as the recovery time 
associated with hysterectomies is (provided the retrieval and recovery is routine) far 
                                                 
80 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. Patientlag. Swedish Code of Statutes 2014:821. Ch. 4, 2§.  
81 It should be noted that neither the Swedish regulation of organ transplantation nor any other related 
act explicitly states that a live organ donor can have the organ returned upon demand or that the organ 
donor cannot have the organ returned upon demand. See Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. Lag 
Om Transplantation m.m. Swedish Code of Statutes 1995:831, p. 351 
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less disruptive to the life of the donor than surrogacy especially where post-
menopausal donors are used. However, whilst this is so, UTx using living donors is 
liable to pose regulatory challenges when it comes to determining who should be 
responsible for meeting the costs of the retrieval surgery, possible complications, 
and recovery period. Given this, and just as the white paper on surrogacy raises the 
question of who is responsible for the surrogate’s potential loss of income and other 
costs associated to the arrangement, the question of who should be responsible for 
the costs of the retrieval surgery would be equally prominent in the case of UTx.  
 
On the one hand, it would perhaps not be unreasonable to expect that live uterus 
donors would fall within the same model of compensation as other live organ donors 
or within the same model as donors of reproductive materials, where the state 
compensates the donor for income loss and similar associated costs. If so, UTx 
would not imply any specific regulatory challenges in this respect. On the other 
however, these questions tie into the broader discussions of whether infertility 
treatments should be publicly funded and more specifically into the complexities of 
priority setting in the context of UTx, which would need to be taken into careful 
consideration in the case of UTx being introduced in public health care.82 
 
In light of the above, we find that in comparison to surrogacy it seems reasonable to 
position UTx as likely to pose fewer, and less complicated, regulatory questions than 
surrogacy. However, while it might be a less complicated alternative this does not 
necessarily make UTx a more ethical alternative. Furthermore, in teasing out the 
regulatory similarities and differences between surrogacy and UTx it is also possible 
                                                 
82 S. Wilkinson & N.J Williams. op. cit. note 56, pp.  559-565. 
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to raise the more general question as to whether, and if so to what extent, anticipated 
regulatory difficulties should function as arguments against the introduction of novel 
health care practices. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION.  
 
Throughout this paper we have explored whether it is reasonable to claim that, for 
involuntarily childless women with AUFI, uterus transplantation using living donors 
is a morally superior option to altruistic surrogacy. This question was chosen 
because, within the ethics and science literature surrounding UTx, it is often 
implicitly assumed that UTx is preferable to surrogacy, not only because it offers 
what surrogacy cannot (gestation), but because it is an option that is less fraught with 
ethical and regulatory difficulties and quandaries than surrogacy and should thus be 
preferred for moral reasons.  
 
As it would have been impossible within this article to examine all possible 
arguments against surrogacy, and in order to situate our discussions and conclusions 
in a real-life policy context, we chose to do this through examination of the key 
arguments forwarded in a recent Swedish white paper which considered whether 
existing legislation and policy should be amended in order to permit altruistic 
surrogacy. However, as has been shown above above, the assumption that UTx is 
morally superior to surrogacy does not survive close scrutiny (at least in cases where 
the arguments considered in the white paper are forwarded against surrogacy). For, 
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where such arguments hold, they also seem to hold straightforwardly in the context 
of UTx using living donors.83  
 
That these two practices raise similar issues is important for reasons of both fairness 
and coherence. When it comes to questions of the laws and principles that govern 
our behaviours consisistency is a virtue and like cases should be treated alike. Thus, 
given that arguments often forwarded against surrogacy seem, for the most part, to 
apply similarly to UTx our prescriptions regarding UTx ought to be informed by the 
position taken regarding surrogacy. They should differ in content only in so far as 
relevant differences – in, for example, the kinds of ethical problems they raise, their 
gravity when considered individually or taken together, and the likelihood of their 
occurrence – can be identified.  
 
No two practices (or indeed, instances of the same practice) are ever identical but 
we suggest that given the similarities that can be identified there is little reason to 
                                                 
83 While our analysis shows that UTx using living donors should not automatically be considered any 
less morally problematic than surrogacy, it does seem that a case can be made in support of a moral 
preference for UTx over surrogacy where uteri for transplantation are obtained from deceased donors. 
After-all, whilst the use of deceased donors in UTx is not exactly morally unproblematic it does seem 
that many of the ethical arguments which may be forwarded against surrogacy and living donor UTx 
seem to engage only to a lesser degree in the case of deceased donor UTx. This may not be the case for 
all concerns such as those concerning the welfare of the child. However, provided one subscribes to the 
Epicurean belief that one’s interests cannot survive one’s death, concerns regarding respect for 
autonomy, informed consent, undue pressure, exploitation and commodification, although still 
warranted in the case of deceased donors, seem far more pressing in both surrogacy and living donor 
UTx as only in living donor UTx and surrogacy may the donor/gestator experience harm as a result.  
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assume that UTx is any less morally problematic all things considered. With this in 
mind, scholars would be wise to refrain from unreflectively suggesting that UTx is 
less morally problematic than surrogacy without explaining exactly why they have 
come to this conclusion and policy makers in countries such as Sweden, which take 
a hard line against altrusitic surrogacy, must consider the possibility that forbidding 
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